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Abstract
The security of ad hoc wireless networks has become a focal point of the military
communications research community. A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is an
autonomous collection of mobile nodes that communicate over relatively bandwidth
constrained, wireless links. Since MANETs require no existing communication
infrastructure, they offer significant advantages in their scalability and flexibility. These
attributes make MANETs extremely attractive for specialized application environments
such as those encountered on the battlefield, in emergency situations, and in disaster
areas. Unfortunately, MANETs also exhibit significant weaknesses in security when
compared to other wireless communication solutions. They are subject to localized
attacks and suffer from vulnerabilities inherent to their structure and topology.
The use of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) offers a cryptographic solution that can
overcome many, but not all, of the MANET security problems. One of the most critical
aspects of a PKI system is how well it implements Key Management. Key Management
deals with key generation, key storage, key distribution, key updating, key revocation,
and certificate service in accordance with security policies over the lifecycle of the
cryptography. While traditional PKI solutions work well in fixed wired networks, they
may not be appropriate for MANETs due to the lack of a fixed infrastructure to support
the PKI. In this research, we investigate key management within PKI implementations in
wireless networks to identify critical factors and best practices to secure these networks.
Recommendations will be made for deploying secure MANETs based upon the research
findings.
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FACTORS IMPACTING KEY MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN
SECURED WIRELESS NETWORKS

I. Introduction
1.1. Background
Advances in microelectronic technologies and reduced systems costs have resulted in
the proliferation of low cost, wireless communication systems across a wide range of
commercial and military communication solutions. In some cases, there is a need for the
rapid deployment of independent mobile users working together towards a common goal.
Examples include establishing survivable, efficient, dynamic communication for
emergency/rescue operations, disaster relief efforts, and military networks. In many of
these situations, cryptography may be employed to insure the confidentiality and integrity
of the information carried in the network.
Key management is a fundamental part of any cryptography system used to secure a
communications network. The effectiveness of a cryptography system largely depends
on the security, robustness, and efficiency of the Key Management System. Specifically,
Key Management deals with key generation, key storage, key distribution, key updating,
key revocation, and certificate services, in accordance with security policies defined by
the organization using the secure network (Bing, 2005).
A Key Management System (KMS) is the collective policy, practices, and
procedures that are dictate the creation, distribution, and management of encryption keys.
For this reason, the security and integrity of the KMS are fundamental aspects of a secure
communications network (Hadjichristofi, 2005). An effective KMS provides high
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service availability in distributed networks and requires minimal pre-configuration during
the network deployment. Security services based on cryptographic mechanisms assume
cryptographic keys to be securely distributed to the communicating parties otherwise the
protection provided by the cryptography can be compromised. Secure key management
is one of the most critical elements when integrating cryptographic functions into a
system, since even the most elaborate security concept will be ineffective if the key
management is weak.
A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is an autonomous collection of mobile users
that communicate over relatively bandwidth constrained wireless links (NISTMAN,
2005). One unique aspect is that the MANET is formed dynamically and will often
employ a multi-hop routing communication scheme. Since the network topology may
change rapidly and unpredictably over time, each node must incorporate a
communication routing protocol that facilitates network discovery, insures message
delivery, and detects and reroutes failed message delivery attempts. Since the networks
are formed dynamically, each node should communicate with other nodes within its
range and collect and distribute this information across the network. The major
advantage of this type of network is the self-organizing property which eliminates the
need for a fixed infrastructure found in other wireless-based networking solutions. The
set of applications for MANETs is diverse, ranging from small, static networks that are
constrained by power sources, to large-scale, mobile, highly dynamic networks. Since
MANETs are extremely flexible and scalable they are ideal for establishing
communications in scenarios where there is no existing communications infrastructure.
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Further, since the range of the communications network is limited, it appears to be an
ideal solution for several military applications.
A security concern in wireless networks is that they are more readily prone to
eavesdropping than a wired network, as there is no physical protection of the medium.
Moreover, every node in MANET has increased responsibility in comparison to a node in
a traditional fixed or mobile network because every node in MANET also serves as a
router. The responsibility each node incurs increases the need for security measures to
assure the confidentiality and integrity of each node. If a MANET node is compromised,
it is possible it can act as a gateway to corrupt the entire network. Further, in some of the
potential MANET application domain, such as those found in the military or law
enforcement, security of the communications is a critical requirement. Moreover, even in
conventional networks that do not require absolute confidentiality, the general public
often demand privacy to keep their private information secure.

1.2. Problem Statement
With the rapid growth of Internet and wireless network technologies, many
communication services have become the focus for future developments in the military
operations, law enforcement, and disaster response domains. Since both Internet and
wireless communications are transported over what is considered insecure transmission
media, the messages have to be encrypted to prevent eavesdroppers or unauthorized users
from capturing the messages. Therefore, secure communications has become a critical
design factor when designing networks for the future (Tseng, 2003). However, there are
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no established guidelines that identify best practices for deploying secure
communications in new network topologies such MANET.
Security services based on cryptographic mechanisms assume cryptographic keys
will be distributed to the communicating parties prior to secure communications. The
secure management of these keys is one of the most critical elements when integrating
cryptographic functions into a system, since even the most elaborate security concept will
be ineffective if the key management is weak (Fumy, 1993). Key Management is the
most critical factor of secure communication regardless of the application. Designing
and implementing any kind of security mechanism requires a shared secret (usually called
the cryptographic key) to construct a trust relationship between two or more
communicating parties. Managing these cryptographic keys play a vital role in providing
reliable, robust, and secure communication (Budakoglu, 2004).
Existing key management solutions are primarily developed based on
conventional network topologies which are fixed and wired. In such networks, the
infrastructure provided supports the underlying mechanisms required for effective key
management. In contrast, wireless ad hoc networks by definition have no fixed
infrastructure elements. Moreover, the nodes of wireless ad hoc networks, especially
sensor network, have several limitations such as memory storage and computational
capabilities. These inherent disadvantages make it difficulty to employ the tradition
solution such as the solution based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
The nodes in a wireless ad hoc network are vulnerable to variety of potential
attacks. An adversary only needs to identify and corrupt a single weak node to potentially

4

disrupt the whole network. One way to mitigate this threat is to implement a
cryptographic solution with strong key management.

1.3. Research Question
The purpose of this study is to identify and assess existing key management
techniques used to secure wireless communication network. The analysis will identify
the strengths and weaknesses inherent in each of the key management techniques. This
research will also identify critical factors related to key management that influence
organizational acceptance of cryptography technology in secure communication network.
It is believed that the identification of these factors will provide guidelines for the
successful implementation of other wireless secure communications network such as
MANET.
In order to satisfy the objective of this study, the primary research question is “What
are the factors impacting Key Management effectiveness in secured wireless networks?”
It is hoped that by answering this question, we can recommend guidelines and best
practices for securing MANETs.
In addition, there are five investigative questions which allow us to effectively
answer the primary research question.
1) What are the characteristics of various secure wireless communications?
2) What are the most common problems encountered when implementing a secure
wireless network?
3) What are the critical success factors in deployment of a secure wireless network?
4) What are types of cryptography are used to secure wireless network?
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5) What is the advantages/weakness of each cryptography technique?

1.4. Methodology
The research conducted in this thesis uses a hybrid research methodology. A
content analysis research methodology is used to examine all literature related to secure
network deployment and to compare and contrast the key characteristics of secure
communication networks. A case study methodology is employed to examine secure
network implementations in detail and to validate the key characteristics identified in the
content analysis. Multiple databases will be queried in order to discover all relevant
literature related to the key management aspects of securing wireless networks. Based on
the collected and evaluated data, critical factors in key management impacting of the
deployment of secure wireless networks will be identified. Finally, a comparative
analysis of the each wireless network topology will be conducted in order to provide a
better understanding of securing networks so that guidelines can be established for
mobile ad hoc networks.

1.5. Scope and Limitations
The scope of this research study is the implementation of secured wireless
communications. In this study, the range of secure communication networks examined
includes wireless networks (WNs), wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and mobile ad-hoc
networks (MANETs).
There are a number of limitations of this research. First, the implementation of
the hybrid research methodology is problematic since I have both formulated the research
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questions and conducted the categorization of references myself which introduces
research bias. Second, there is a lack of substantial information available on MANET
implementations. This is primary a consequence of the infancy of the MANET
technology. Third, I am unable to obtain some of the classified references due to my
status as an international student. Therefore, I will analyze all of the unclassified
references related to securing wireless related network topologies and infer guidelines
and best practices in MANETs. Finally, I will focus my research on Key Management
issues rather than the underlying technical and mathematical details of the cryptography
used in securing a network. This research will survey, provide an overview, and analyze
the literature related to key management aspects of securing WNs, WSNs, and MANETs.

1.6. Thesis Overview
In this chapter, I have provided a brief introduction of the issues related to securing
wireless networks. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2
presents a literature review of all key management related secure wireless network
literature. This chapter explains the basic concept of cryptography including key
management in a secure communications environment. Chapter 3 describes the hybrid
methodology used in this study in order to answer the research questions. In chapter 4,
we provide a detailed analysis of Key Management techniques and discuss their
implementation in a secure wireless communication network. Chapter 5 provides a
detailed summary of the analysis conducted and provides conclusions and
recommendations for future research.
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II. Literature Review

2.1. Overview
In this chapter, we examine all existing literature related to securing wireless
networks. The objective of this chapter is to provide common understanding of wireless
network environment, security, and key management. This chapter will introduce the
concept of a secure network, introduce the basic concepts of symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography, and discuss the importance of a Pubic Key Infrastructure (PKI) and its
relation to key management. The literature review provides the necessary background
information to understand the importance of key management in a secured wireless
network environment.

2.2. The Secured Wireless Communications Network Environment
2.2.1. Wireless Networks (WNs)
The future of communications has dramatically changed as the result of the
deployment of low cost, wireless communications technology. The integration of wired
and wireless networks has enabled new collaborative communication capabilities that
link military sensors in theater with command and control systems located thousands of
miles away. Large numbers of entities participating in these communications require the
use of efficient methods of securing network in order to reduce network congestion
(Kostas, 2003).

8

There has been a rapid development in high-speed computing and communication,
miniaturization of computers, and deployment of wireless communication infrastructures.
Today, Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) are rapidly and widely accepted as a
complementary technology to high-speed wired LAN technologies and various cellular
networks. WLANs have experienced an amazing development and a rapid growth.
Advances in these technologies have engendered a new paradigm of computing providing
flexibility in accessing information anywhere and at any time. For a wider acceptance,
WLAN technologies should evolve such that they support QoS (Quality-of-Service)
provisioning, secure communications, integration with other wireless networks, power
conservation, seamless mobility support and a fair bandwidth sharing (Labiod, 2004).
In wireless networks, where the error rate is high and the bandwidth is limited, the
design of key management schemes should focus on reducing the communication burden
associated with key updating. A global wireless infrastructure will free users from the
confines of static communication networks. Users will be able to access the Internet from
anywhere at anytime. As wireless connections become ubiquitous, users will desire to
have secure applications running on their mobile devices (Yan, 2004).
Network security has received critical attention from various areas. As the data
network becomes more pervasive and its scale becomes larger, network intrusion and
attacks have become larger threats to network users. This is especially true for the
emerging wireless data networks. Compared to their wired counterpart, wireless
networks are especially prone to security attacks ranging from passive eavesdropping to
active interfering. It is difficult to protect against intrusions in the wireless environment
and occasional intrusions in a large scale mobile network are inevitable over long periods
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of time (Kong, 2001). Because of wireless links’ specific characteristics, new security
flaws arise within a WLAN. The necessity of securing WLANs has led to a consensus on
the definition of newer, more robust authentication architectures. (Bakirdan, 2003).

2.2.2. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
As technology advances and the integration of low-power radio, computing and
sensor technology becomes reality; wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are introduced as
new type of wireless networks. These networks will typically consist of a lot of ultra low
power nodes, with limited communication means and CPU power (Kahn, 1999; Rabaey,
2000).
Sensor networks consist of a large number of sensor nodes which typically have
limited resources. They are used to monitor buildings and industries, and they can also be
used in asset tracking, environmental sensing, etc. Generally, sensor nodes communicate
with each other through wireless communication; therefore, security services such as
encryption and authentication are required to prevent eavesdropping, alteration, and
spoofing (Ito, 2005). In sensor network, there are many applications like gathering
distributed information. Typically, the low-power sensors which scattered over the area
to be monitored have the ability to gather data, and process and forward it to a central
node for further processing (Jolly, 2003).
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of a large number of small sensor nodes
equipped with limited computation capacity, restricted memory space, limited power
resource and short-range radio communication device (Zhen, 2005). WSNs can be used
in a wide range of applications, including military sensing, environment monitoring,
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collecting vital signs of patients, smart houses, etc. Most of these applications require
high-leveled security for WSN. WSN has its own characteristics, such as being prone to
change; being limited in energy, memory and computation resources; and being subject
to physical attack. These characteristics make it a challenging work to design secure
scheme for WSN (RuiYing, 2005).
Although the capacities of these sensor nodes are growing, their resources are still
very limited. In such an environment, overheads should be kept to a strict minimum,
nodes should go into “sleep mode” to save energy, and security protocols should follow
the same “energy-focused” design and consume as little power as possible (Seys, 2005).
In military applications, sensor nodes may be deployed in a hostile environment such
as battlefield. Security is challenges for wireless sensor networks, because an adversary
can easily gain access to mission critical or private information by monitoring
communications between sensor nodes. For example, an adversary may try to eavesdrop
on confidential traffic, to impersonate nodes to insert bogus data, and to cripple normal
network operation by maliciously modifying routing information. In order to protect
WSNs from these attacks, communication should be encrypted and authenticated.
Therefore, it is important to encrypt communications between sensor nodes to maintain
confidentiality (Zhen, 2005).

2.2.3. Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET)
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) are special type of wireless networks where
mobile hosts in wireless network may form a temporary network without the aid of any
fixed and centralized infrastructure. In a MANET, nodes within their wireless ranges can
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communicate with each other directly, assuming that all nodes have the same
transmission range. On the other hand, nodes outside the range have to use some other
intermediate nodes to relay messages which create dynamic, multi-hop communication
architecture. In such a communication, the packets sent by source host are relayed by
several intermediate hosts before reaching the destination host (Bing, 2005). For this
reason, every node plays a role of a router and must be capable of dynamically rerouting
and storing messages on an as needed basis. In order for this network architecture to
work, there must be a common protocol that all nodes use to achieve reliable
communications.
In MANETs, the need for pre-existing infrastructure is not required because each of
the nodes perform all network services. These nodes can communicate each other
autonomously. The error-prone wireless medium and frequent link breakage caused by
node mobility make the connectivity between the nodes to be irregular. A fully selforganized MANET allows the end-users to establish the network solely for a common
purpose in an ad hoc fashions. For example, a group of strangers with computing devices
who have never met before might create a self-organized MANET for a common
purpose. These strangers have no pre-existing relationships and share no common secret
keying material on their nodes. Thus, users within this network have to establish security
associations between themselves after the network is constructed without any aid of a
pre-shared keying material or any form of trusted third party (Merwe, 2005).
Low resource availability demands efficient resource utilization and makes it
difficulty to use complicate authentication and encryption algorithms. Most often, limited
power storage and computational capability prevent nodes in MANETs to utilize
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enhanced encryption methodologies. Conventional PKI-based authentication and
encryption mechanisms are relatively expensive in computational power to generate and
verify digital signatures. This cost often prevents their practical application to use in
MANETs. Symmetric key technique has been proven to be more efficient due to less
computational complexity, but comes with the cost of pre-sharing a secret key (Deng,
2004).
One of the main goals of this research is to determine if traditional PKI-based
cryptography is suitable for used in MANETs. The inherent infrastructureless nature of
MANETs makes it hard to provide the capability required in traditional PKI
implementations. In addition, another serious problem that occurs in MANETs is the
physical vulnerability of the nodes themselves. While mobile nodes within an
infrastructure-based wireless networks have the same vulnerability, they easily receive
some help with recovery since they can rely on the infrastructure for detection and
remediation of compromised nodes. In an infrastructure-based network, infrastructure has
most sensitive information which mobile nodes need in order to communicate and the
mobile nodes manage only minimal information. In a MANET, the mobile nodes have a
higher vulnerability profile since there is no stable infrastructure (Yi, 2002).
Many target applications for MANETs require strong communication security to
operate. Prime examples include battlefield communication support, law enforcement
communications, and disaster recovery operations which bring together large
communities of diverse organizations. However, the same infrastructureless nature of
MANETs that makes it ideal for easy, fast, and cost-effective deployment also makes it
difficulty to support secure communications. Many security solutions rely on public key
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(asymmetric) cryptography, the deployment of which requires the effective management
of digital certificates through two fundamental services: secure binding of a
cryptographic key to an entity (e.g. a user, a mobile node, or a service) and the validation
of such bindings to other entities. Most key management frameworks and other security
services designed for wired networks and infrastructure-based wireless networks rely on
a trusted infrastructure for security-related functions. However, in an ad hoc network
without any infrastructure support, most traditional solutions are not directly applicable
(Yi, 2004).
MANETs are a new paradigm of wireless communication for mobile nodes. In a
MANET, there is no fixed infrastructure such as base stations or mobile switching
centers. Mobile nodes that are within each other’s radio range communicate directly via
wireless links, while those that are far apart rely on other nodes to relay messages as
routers. Node mobility in an ad hoc network causes frequent changes of the network
topology. Figure 1 shows such an example: initially, nodes A and D have a direct link
between them. When D moves out of A’s radio range, the link is broken. However, the
network is still connected, because A can reach D through C, E, and F. Military tactical
operations are still the main application of ad hoc networks today. For example, military
units (e.g., soldiers, tanks, or planes) equipped with wireless communication devices,
could form an ad hoc network when they roam in a battlefield. Ad hoc networks can also
be used for emergency, law enforcement, and disaster recovery missions. Since an ad hoc
network can be deployed rapidly with relatively low cost, it becomes an attractive option
for commercial uses such as sensor networks or virtual classrooms (Zhou, 1999).
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Figure 1. Ad Hoc Mobile Networks (Zhou, 1999)
Topology change in ad hoc network: nodes A, B, C, D, E, and F constitute and ad hoc
network. The circle represents the radio range of node A. The network initially has the
topology in (a). When node D moves out of the radio range of A, the network topology
changes to the one in (b).

Wireless ad hoc networks have been proposed to support dynamic scenarios where
no wired infrastructure exists (Yi, 2001). Most ad hoc routing protocols are cooperative
by nature (Royer, 1999), and rely on implicit trust-your-neighbor relationships to route
packets among participating nodes. This naïve trust model allows malicious nodes to
paralyze an ad hoc network by inserting erroneous routing updates, replaying old routing
information, changing routing updates, or advertising incorrect routing information
(Marti, 2000). While these attacks are possible in fixed networks as well, the nature of the
ad hoc environment magnifies their effects, and makes their detection difficult (Zhang,
2000).
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Ad hoc networks are subject to various kinds of attacks. Wireless communication
links can be eavesdropped on without noticeable effort and communication protocols on
all layers are vulnerable to specific attacks. In contrast to wire-line networks, known
attacks like masquerading, man-in-the-middle, and replaying of messages can easily be
carried out. Moreover, deploying security mechanisms is difficult due to inherent
properties of ad hoc networks, such as the high dynamics of their topology (due to
mobility and joining/leaving devices), limited resources of end systems, or bandwidthrestricted and possibly asymmetrical communication links (Bechler, 2004).

2.3. Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Cryptography
Cryptography is a method of storing and transmitting data in a form that only those it
is intended for can read and process. It is considered the science of protecting information
by encoding it into an unreadable format for later decryption only by authorized parties.
Cryptography is an effective way of protecting sensitive information as it is stored on
media or transmitted through untrusted network communication paths (Harris, 2003)
Cryptography techniques are used to enable secure communications in both wired
and wireless networks (Bing, 2005). Symmetric key cryptography has computation
efficiency, but it also has weaknesses in the management of secret keys. Asymmetric key
cryptography is widely used because of its simplicity in key distribution. However, this
technique relies on a centralized infrastructure and is resource expensive.
In symmetric key techniques, the sender and recipient have pre-shared a secret key,
which is used for various cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption and
verification of message authentication data (Dankers, 2002). Thus, parties who want to
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communicate each other have the same secret key in order to encrypt and decrypt
messages. This secret key must be exchanged in a separate out-of-band procedure prior
to the intended communication. The need to exchange a secret key prior to the intended
communication complicates the security for transactions between entities that do not have
a pre-established relationship. Authentication is provided by proving possession of the
pre-shared secret key to each other. As the number of keys grows, the administration and
management of secret keys, including their generation, distribution, renewal and storage,
can become intractable. For each pair of entities, a secret key has to be created and
distributed, so that for a group n entities communicating with each other

n(n − 1)
keys are
2

required (Dankers, 2002). Figure 2 shows that the number of key required in symmetric
key cryptography system grows exponentially with the number of users.

n = 4,

n( n − 1) 4 ⋅ ( 4 − 1)
=
=6
2
2

n = 5,

n(n − 1) 5 ⋅ (5 − 1)
= 10
=
2
2

Figure 2. The Number of Keys Required in Symmetric Cryptography

Because of the need for pre-shared secret keys, secret key based solutions scale
poorly. However, a major advantage of symmetric secret key techniques is that they are
computationally efficient and they require small overhead when compared to asymmetric
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key techniques (Dankers, 2002). This is the main reason why many applications
currently still use secret key mechanisms for communication system. Figure 3
demonstrates the process of symmetric key cryptography.

Figure 3. A Symmetric Key Cryptography System

Symmetric key cryptography performs encryption and decryption with a single key.
The security of this system is thus determined by protecting the "secret key" from
disclosure. As such, this is applicable only in situations where the distribution of the key
can occur in a secure manner. Many applications often preclude the "safe" distribution of
the key, and so symmetric-key cryptography is often used in tandem with asymmetric
cryptography. Examples of symmetric cryptography algorithms include DES, 3DES,
Blowfish, IDEA, CAST128, and Arcfour.
An asymmetric key technique is used for public key cryptography system (Dankers,
2002). Usually each user has just one key pair consisting of a public key and a private
key. One of the keys of the pair is made publicly available, while the other key is kept
private. Because one of the keys is available publicly there is no need for a pre-shared
secret key. Note that restricting distribution of the public key can be used to enable
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secure communications between organizations who may want to share information
securely in the future. However, there is a need for an infrastructure to distribute and
manage the public key authentically. Because there is no need for pre-existed secrets
prior to a communication, public key techniques are appropriate for supporting security
between previously unknown parties such as ad hoc network. Authentication is achieved
by proving possession of the private key (Dankers, 2002). A digital signature is one
mechanism used for doing this. The digital signature is generated with the private key
and verified using the corresponding public key, which is bound to the entity generating
the signature (Dankers, 2002).
Asymmetric key techniques make it possible to establish secret keys dynamically
(Dankers, 2002). In simplified procedure, an end-entity calculates a secret key and sends
it encrypted with the public key of the entity with which it wants to communicate. That
entity then obtains the secret key by decrypting the received information with its private
key. As the public key of a key pair is usually published in a directory, the overhead
associated with distributing key material to communicating parities is reduced
significantly in comparison with solutions based solely on symmetric secret key
techniques. For a group of n entities communicating with each other, only n key pairs are
required (Dankers, 2002). However, a weakness of asymmetric key techniques is that
they are computationally very intensive. This intensiveness makes them less suitable for
environment where devices of size and processing power are limited, such as wireless
sensor network. Figure 4 demonstrate the process of asymmetric key cryptography.
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Figure 4. An Asymmetric Key Cryptography System

In asymmetric cryptography, the public and private keys are related to each other,
but obtaining the private key from its public counterpart is an NP-complete problem and
is thus infeasible to undertake. To illustrate how public-key cryptography works,
consider the hypothetical example of two people named Alice and Bob who would like to
communicate with each other in private. Assuming Alice already has Bob's public key,
she encrypts her message to Bob with his public key. Bob receives the message and
decrypts it using his private key. If an eavesdropper, say Eve, were to capture Alice's
message in transit and re-send it to conceal her presence, she will be unable to decrypt it
just by owning a copy of Bob’s public key. She can certainly try to obtain the private key
from the public key but it will take her a prohibitively long time to do so. RSA and DSA
are examples of public key cryptographic algorithms.

2.4. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Public key cryptography is one of most effective mechanisms for providing
fundamental security services including authentication, digital signatures and encryption
for the successful implementation of asymmetric key cryptography (Yi, 2002). Public
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Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides a means for key management and the infrastructure
necessary for managing digital certificates. The most important component of PKI is the
CA (Certificate Authority), the trusted entity in the system that vouches for the validity of
digital certificate. The success of PKI depends on the availability of the CA to the
principals in the system (or the nodes in the network) since a principals must correspond
with the CA to get a certificate, check the status of another principal’s certificate (in some
cases), and acquire another principal’s digital certificate. PKI is widely used in wired
networks and some infrastructure-based wireless networks (Yi, 2002).
Public key cryptography is uniquely well-suited to certain parts of a secure global
network. It is widely accepted that public key security systems are easier to administer,
more secure, less trustful, and have better geographical reach, than symmetric key
security systems. However, it is not widely appreciated that these advantages rely
excessively on the end-user’s security discipline. With public key cryptography, clients
must constantly be careful to rigorously validate every public key they use, and they must
maintain the secrecy of their long-lived private keys. It turns out that these tasks are
harder than they seem (Davis, 1996).
The ubiquitous capability of verifying the binding between a public key and the
owner principal plays an important role in the successful application of pubic key
cryptography. In a communications system, the mainstream solution is to have a thirdparty centrally trusted entity, called Certificate Authority (CA), vouch for the authenticity
of the binding by signing digital certificates. In practice, CAs and digital certificates are
organized and maintained by the standards defined by the Public Key Infrastructure. In a
wireless environment, all devices are opened to attack to the same extent and no one can
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be assumed to be significantly more secure than the others. Moreover, devices can roam,
run out of power, leave and later rejoin a network, stop functioning, all of which lead to
volatile connectivity among nodes and CAs (Gang, 2004).
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) consists of program, data format procedures,
communication protocols, security policies, and public key cryptographic mechanisms
working in a comprehensive manner to enable a wide range of dispersed people to
communicate in a secure and predictable fashion. In other words, a PKI establishes a
level of trust within an environment. Formally, a PKI is an ISO authentication
framework that uses public key cryptography and the X.509 standard protocols. The
framework was set up to enable authentication to happen across different networks and
the Internet. Particular protocols and algorithms are not specified, which is why PKI is
called a framework and not a specific technology (Harris, 2003).
Many security protocols in use today were designed under the assumption that some
form of global distributed public-key infrastructure would eventually emerge to address
key management problems. These protocols go back to the early 1990s, when a universal
PKI was thought to be available in the short term. Unfortunately, it has not evolved as
quickly as thought. Consequently, existing protocols originally designed to rely on a
global PKI must either employ ad hoc solutions (Gutmann, 2004).

2.4.1. Certificate Authority
PKI architectures traditionally fall into three configurations: A single CA, a
hierarchy of CAs, or a mesh of CAs. Each configuration is characterized by the number
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of CAs, the trust relationships between the CAs, and where PKI users place their trust
(Polk, 2003):

–

Single CA: The simplest architecture contains a single CA that provides

certificates and certificate status information for every user. The CA’s public key is the
fundamental point of trust, or trust anchor, for evaluating certificate acceptability.
Users have a direct relationship with the CA, so they know which applications the
certificates should be used for.
–

CA Hierarchy: PKIs constructed with superior–subordinate CA relationships are

called hierarchical PKIs. The foundation of such an architecture is the “root” CA (the
trust anchor for all users of the PKI), which issues certificates to subordinate CAs but
not to users.
–

CA Mesh: The traditional alternative to hierarchical PKIs is to create a mesh PKI,

or web of trust, to connect CAs via P2P relationships. Any CA in a mesh PKI can be a
trust anchor, although users generally consider the CA that issued their certificate as
their trust anchor.

2.4.2. Algorithm
A standard analogy (Mollin, 2003) for public-key cryptography is given as follows.
Suppose that Bob has a wall safe with a secret combination lock known only to him, and
the safe is left open and made available to passers-by. Then anyone, including Alice, can
put messages in the safe and lock it. However, only Bob can retrieve the message, since
even Alice, who left a message in the box, has no way of retrieving the message.
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The key-exchange protocol devised by Diffie-Hellman (Diffie, 1976) did not provide
a complete solution to the notion give above of a public-key cryptosystem. The first to
publicly do this were Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA), for which their name are
attached to the cryptosystem which we now describe.
We break the algorithm into two parts with the underlying assumption that Alice
wants to send a message to Bob. The first part is RSA key generation.

(1) Bob generates toe large, random prime p ≠ q of roughly the same size.
(2) He computed both n = pq and φ (n) = ( p − 1)(q − 1) . The integer n is called hi
s (RSA) modulus.
(3) He select a random e ∈ N such that 1 < e < φ (n) and gcd(e, φ (n)) = 1 . The int
eger e is called his (RSA) enciphering exponent.
(4) Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, he computes the unique d ∈ N with

1 < d < φ (n) such that ed ≡ 1 (mod φ (n))
(5) Bob publishes (n, e) in some public database and keeps d, p, q, and φ (n) priva
te. Thus, Bob’s (RSA) public-key is (n, e) and his (RSA) private key is d. the i
nteger d is called his (RSA) deciphering exponent.
Table 1. First Part of RSA Algorithm (Mollin, 2003)

The second part is RSA public-key cipher. This part again is dived into two subparts;
enciphering stage and deciphering stage. In enciphering stage, in order to simplify this
stage, we assume that the plaintext message m ∈ M is in numerical form with m < n .
Also, M = C = Z / nZ , and we assume that gcd(m, n) = 1 .
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(1) Alice obtains Bob’s public-key (n, e) form the database.
(2) She enciphers m by computing c ≡ m e (mod n) using the repeated squaring m
ethod.
(3) She sends c ∈ C to Bob.
Table 2. Second Part of RSA Algorithm (Mollin, 2003)
In deciphering stage, once Bob receives c, he used d to compute m ≡ c d (mod n) .
Moreover, the decryption is unique in that we always recover the intended plaintext.

2.5. Key Management
Cryptography can be used as a security mechanism to provide confidentiality,
integrity, and authentication as long as the keys are not compromised in any way. If the
keys can be captured, modified, corrupted, or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, then
the whole cryptosystem can become compromised. Cryptography is based on a trust
model. Individuals trust each other to protect their own keys, they trust the administrator
who is maintaining the keys, and they in turn trust a server that holds, maintains, and
distributes the keys.
Key management is a basic part of any secure communication. Most
cryptosystems rely on some underlying secure, robust, and efficient key management
system. Key management deals with key generation, storage, distribution, updating,
revocation, and certificate service, in accordance with security policies. If the key is
exposed, the encrypted information would not be protected from malicious attacker. The
secrecy of the symmetric key and private key must be guaranteed assuredly. Key
distribution and key agreement through an insecure channel is at high risk and suffers
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from possible attacks. In the traditional digital envelop approach, one side produce a
session key and encrypts it using the public-key algorithm. After such a generation and
encryption, the other side receives and recovers it. In the Diffie-Hellman (DH) scheme,
communication parties of both sides share some public information and generate a
session key on both sides. A number of complicated key exchange or distribution
protocols and frameworks have been designed and built. However, mobile ad hoc
networks have strongly restricted computation load and complexity of key agreement
protocol because of node’s lack of available resource, dynamic network topology, or
network synchronization difficulty. Key integrity and ownership should be protected
from strong key attacks. Digital signature, message digest and hashed message
authentication code (HMAC) are techniques used for the data authentication or integrity
purpose. In the same way, public key is protected by public-key certificate in which a
trusted entity called certification authority (CA) in PKI vouches the binding of the public
key with owner’s identity. In systems where there is no trusted third party (TTP), publickey certificate is vouched by peer nodes in a distributed manner, such as pretty good
privacy (PGP). Obviously, the purpose of key authentication is that certificate can prove
the ownership of key rather than decide whether it is good or not. After certain valid
period of usage, the key could be compromised or disposed. Since key should not use
again after its disclosure, some mechanism is required to revoke the compromised key in
not expired period. Certificate contains the lifetime of validity. If the key is expired, it is
not useful. However, the private key maybe is able to be disclosed during the valid period.
In this case, certificate authority (CA) needs to revoke this certificate explicitly and notify
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the network by using the certificate revocation list (CRL) to prevent its invalid usage
(Bing, 2005).
Key maintenance is a very important factor in securing a communications
network. There is more to key maintenance than simply using them to encrypt and
decrypt messages. The keys have to be distributed securely to the right entities and
updated continuously. The keys need to be protected as they are being transmitted and
while they are being stored on each workstation and server. The keys need to generated,
destroyed, and recovered properly on demand by authorized individuals. The keys must
be stored securely before and after distribution. When a key is distributed to a user, it is
not going to be located in any location; it needs a secure place to be stored and used only
in a controlled manner. The keys, the algorithm that will use the key, configurations, and
parameters are stored in a module that also needs to be protected. If an attacker were able
to obtain these components, she could masquerade as another user and decrypt, read, and
re-encrypt messages that were not intended for her (Harris, 2003)
A Key Management System (KMS) creates, distributes, and manages these
certificates. Thus, the KMS is at the heart of the network’s defenses. A KMS provides
high service availability in highly partitioned networks, requires minimal preconfiguration during the network deployment phase, and can accommodate new nodes
joining the network (Hadjichristofi, 2005).
Cryptographic keys have to be randomly generated. The secret keying material that
must either be physically secured or enciphered allows protecting itself from disclosure,
and the authentication of keying material prevents from illegal modification.
Authentication may be implemented with the use of parameters like counters or
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timestamps to also protect from replay of old keys, insertion of false keys, and
substitution or deletion of keys. All keying material is related to one or more
subjects/objects of a system. Additionally it intended to be used for some particular
purpose. A major threat for systems is generated when proper identification of all
subjects accessing the system is provided. Thus, a key management system is feasible if it
guarantees the relation between an entity and its uniquely defined keys (Fumy, 1993).
If the key management has weakness, the security system using this cryptography is
ineffective. Key management is the most important element of secure communication
network. The secrecy of the cryptographic key is essential when designing and
implementing any kind of security mechanism in order to set up a trust relationship
between two or more communicating parties. Managing these cryptographic keys play a
critical role in establishing reliable and robust security communication. Key management
can be defined as generating, storing, distributing, deleting or archiving keys in reference
to a security policy (Budakoglu, 2004).
Key management activities include the generation, distribution or agreement,
storage, utilization, archiving, deletion, and destruction of cryptographic key material to
support cryptographically based security mechanisms employed by security protocols.
Because OSI is concerned solely with the communications aspects of end-system and
intermediate systems, a key management protocol is limited to the communications
aspects of key management. An implementation of an OSI key management protocol and
its supporting security mechanisms must ensure that key material is not disclosed or
modified during exchanges, and that the key material is protected from insertion,
substitution, and deletion (Jansen, 1993).
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The level of security provided by an encryption-based scheme for secure
communication across a data network is highly dependent on the security of the keys
used for the encryption and decryption of data. The feasibility of such an updating,
particularly when end-to-end encryption is contemplated, depends on the existence of a
key management mechanism that facilitates, at the initiation of each new session, the
generation of a session key and its distribution to the two end communicants.
Furthermore, it is desirable that this transfer be made on the existing communication
channels, which in turn demands the highest level of security during such a transfer.
Consequently, key management is more important to the working security of a network
than the mathematical structure of the encryption algorithm itself, since an inefficient key
transfer between the end communicants can make the entire scheme worthless regardless
of how complex the encryption itself is (Lu, 1989).

2.5.1. Key Exchange
Key exchange is the most primitive form of key management. People wishing to
communicate over an insecure channel must exchange a cryptographic key. The use of
physical key exchange was the earliest form of key management, if it can be described as
key management at all. Usually, key exchange is the most inconvenient method of
creating a secure association between two communicating entities. However, in some ad
hoc networking scenarios it is NOT inconvenient but actually a requirement. Thus, for
small personal area networks or similar scenarios, physical key exchange must be both
logical and convenient (Lehane, 2003).
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2.5.2. Key Agreement and Group Keying
Group keying allows multiparty secure communications, and hence provides group
level authentication and security. However, providing keying information for individual
members of the group (i.e. to allow people to communicate privately in the presence of
other group members) requires other predetermined key agreements. Indeed networks
may form where group affiliation doesn’t exist, particularly in a large-scale civilian
network. As such, a group key agreement is of limited utility in a non-group oriented
network, such as a civilian network in which many nodes choose to communicate but
some require end-to-end privacy. A public key infrastructure is better suited to this
scenario (Lehane, 2003).

2.5.3. A Summary of Key Management
A summary of key management is provided below (Bing, 2005):
1. The secrecy of key itself must be assured in the local host system.
2. Secured network communications involved in the key distribution procedure
between communication parties must be insured when the key may be transmitted
through insecure channels to maintain key confidentiality and integrity.
3. A framework of trust relationships needs to be built for authentication of key
ownership. While some frameworks are based on a centralized Trusted Third
Party (TTP), other could be fully distributed. For example, a Certificate Authority
is the TTP in PKI, Key Distribution Center (KDC) in the symmetric system,
meanwhile in PGP, no such a trusted entity is assumed.
4. The key can become expired or have been revoked within its valid period.
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III. Methodology
3.1. Overview
This chapter discusses the methodologies used to conduct this research. In order
to answer the primary research question, both a content analysis and a case study
methodology are employed. In some cases, a qualitative approach may be used. Finally,
a comparison analysis is provided in last stage in order to offering better understanding of
results. Specifically, this chapter will describe the research design, explain why the
methodology approach is appropriate for this effort, and describe how these data will be
analyzed to answer the research question presented.

3.2. Selecting Methodology
Leedy (2001) provides a methodology to select between the Qualitative and
Quantitative research approaches. Leedy (2001) also enumerates five basic research
characteristics: purpose, process, data collection, data analysis, and reporting findings.
These characteristics help the researcher to make a decision so that best approach applies
to their particular area of study. In Table 3 (Leedy, 2001), there are five general questions
used to determine if the research is quantitative or qualitative.

31

Question:
What is the purpose of the
research?

What is the nature of the
research process?

What are the methods of
data collection?
What is the form of
reasoning used in analysis?

Quantitative
• To explain and predict
• To confirm and validate
• To test theory
• Focused
• Known variables
• Established guidelines
• Static design
• Context-free
• Detached View
• Representative, large
sample
• Standardized instruments
• Deductive analysis

Qualitative:
• To describe and explain
• To explore and interpret
• To build theory
• Holistic
• Unknown variables
• Flexible guidelines
• Emergent design
• Context-bound
• Personal view
• Informative, small sample
• Observations, interviews
• Inductive analysis

• Numbers
• Statistics, aggregated data
• Formal voice, scientific
style

• Words
• Narratives, individual
How are findings
quotes
communicated?
• Personal voice, literary
style
Table 3. Selection of Methodological Approach (Leedy, 2001)

1) Purpose: Quantitative researchers seek to explain and predicate relationships and to
develop generalizations. Qualitative researchers seek a better understanding and may use
their observations to build theory (Leedy, 2001).
2) Process: Leedy (2001) also discusses the research process. The quantitative research
processes provides carefully structured guidelines. The qualitative research process is
more holistic and emergent in design, measurement instruments, and interpretations
(Leedy, 2001).
3) Data Collection: Leedy (2001) states that during quantitative data collection,
researchers identify variables and accumulate data specifically related to those variables
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from a population. In qualitative data collection, the researchers operate under the
assumption that reality is not easily divided into discrete, measurable variables.
4) Data Analysis: For data analysis, all research requires logical reasoning. Quantitative
researchers tend to depend on deductive reasoning while qualitative researchers make
considerable use of inductive reasoning. (Leedy, 2001).
5) Report Findings: In order to report findings, quantitative researchers typically reduce
their data numbers and employ the power of interpretation. Qualitative researchers
construct interpretive narratives from their data and try to capture the complexity of the
phenomenon under study (Leedy, 2001).

By using these questions to determine the proper research approach, the
qualitative methodology appears to me the most desirable methodology for this research.
Leedy (2001) explains that research studies are enhanced by combining both qualitative
and quantitative research approaches. Even if quantitative approach is not designed, this
study may use some quantitative data that may enhance the qualitative data analysis.
On the other hand, Yin (2003) states, there are several ways for social science
research. These consist of: experiments, surveys, histories, analysis of archival
information, and case study. When choosing a research method, each strategy has
advantages and disadvantages, depending on three conditions: (a) the type of research
question, (b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events and
(c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena (Yin, 2003).
Table 4 shows these three conditions and explains how to be related to the five major
research strategies.
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Strategy

Form of Research
Question

Requires Control of
Behavioral Event?

Experiment

How, Why?
Yes
Who, What, Where,
How many, How
Survey
No
much?
Who, What, Where,
Archival analysis
How many, How
No
much?
History
How, Why?
No
Case Study
How, Why?
No
Table 4. Strategy for Research Design (Yin, 2003)

Focuses on
Contemporary
Events
Yes
Yes

Yes / No
No
Yes

3.3. Qualitative Research
The qualitative study is an inquiry process of understanding a social or human
problem conducted in a natural setting. The three factors determine the appropriate
research approach: research problem, personal experiences of the researcher, and the
audience. The qualitative approach is appropriate to investigate exploratory research
problems by researchers with experience in literary writing and intending to present their
results to practitioners (Creswell, 2003).
In addition, other researchers provide guidelines for selecting the qualitative
approach. According to Leedy (2001), a case study is a type of qualitative research in
which information is collected about a single or multiple cases to learn more about an
unknown or poorly understood state of affairs (Leedy, 2001). Yin state that case studies
investigate contemporary problems within real-life context to account for pertinent
influences on the research topic (Yin, 2003).
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Leedy (2001) explains that the relationship between data and methodology is
inextricably interdependent. For this reason, choosing the appropriate methodology must
always consider the data that will be collected in the resolution of the problem. To
accurately state, the research questions, a flexible approach was needed to explore the
unknown. Patton (2002) explains that qualitative inquiries come from exploration,
discovery, and inductive logic. An inductive approach is used in this research to find out
what the important questions and variables are (Patton, 2002). Then, a qualitative
approach is suitable to answer the research and investigative questions of this
exploration.
Quantitative research is used when exploring the relationships between measured
variables in order to explain, predict, or control phenomena (Leedy, 2001). Moreover,
quantitative research tries to either prove or disprove hypotheses that are under study.
Conversely, qualitative research attempts to answer questions relating to the complexity
of a phenomenon using the participant’s point of view as the basis for explaining or
understanding the events (Leedy, 2001). Lastly, qualitative research may end with
hypotheses generated or temporary answers relating to the phenomena under study. The
qualitative research methodology is used in a lot of disciplines in an attempt to determine
and explain what has happened or is happening (Leedy, 2001).
A qualitative approach is appropriate when developing new insight about a
phenomenon (Leedy, 2001). In the case of this research, the phenomenon is the
environment of secure network such as mobile ad hoc network and the insights are the
security issues on such a secure network. Because the data for this research is obtained
from written text, Denzin categorize it as a test as proxy for experience using free flowing
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text (Denzin, 2000). They list six methodologies that could be used for this type of data,
but suggest content analysis as the most appropriate research method for this type of data
(Denzin, 2000). Leedy (2001) agrees with this description of content analysis as a
detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular body of material for
the purpose of identifying patterns (Leedy, 2001). By analyzing text, the researcher finds
codes or the intent of what is written (Leedy, 2001). Neuendorf (2002) also concurs by
stating that a content analysis is a systematic, objective, quantitative, analysis of message
characteristics. Each of these definitions shows that content analysis is an appropriate
methodology in order to satisfy the purpose of this research. Thus, content analysis was
chosen as the best methodology to answer the questions posed in this study.

3.4. Case Study
The case study is especially suitable for learning more about a poorly understood
situation (Leedy, 2001). The case study strategy is used when the research satisfies the
following three conditions: the research questions must be in the form of how or why, the
researcher must not have any control over events, and the study must focus on a
contemporary event or problem (Yin, 2003).
Yin (2003) defines the appropriateness of case study as a research method by
providing the following technical definition: A case study is an empirical inquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003).
Leedy (2001) also supports the use of a case study in situations when its unique or
exceptional qualities can promote understanding or inform practice for similar situations,
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and a case study may be especially suitable for learning more about a little known or
poorly understood situation (Leedy, 2001).
A number of definitions for the case study methodology have existed over the
years. In case studies, the researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a
process, or one or more individuals. The case (or cases) is bounded by time and activity.
Researchers gather detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures
(Stake, 1995).
The case study approach to qualitative research constitutes a specific way of
collecting, organizing, and analyzing data (Patton, 2002). In a case study, a particular
individual, program, or event is studied in-depth for a defined period of time (Leedy,
2001). The researcher will investigate a topic when the theory base is unknown
(Creswell, 2003). The researcher tries to test the validity of certain assumptions, claims,
theories, or generalizations within real-world contexts (Leedy, 2001).
A lot of the definitions of case study exist (Leedy, 2001; Patton, 2002; Stake,
1995; Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) states that the case study constructs an all-encompassing
method and it include the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific
approaches to data analysis. Regardless of the chosen definition, Benbasat (1987) explain
that the case study is suitable to capture the knowledge of practitioners and to develop
theories. Benbasat (1987) listed eleven characteristics of case studies. Table 5 is the
eleven characteristics. These characteristics of the case study method were related to the
purpose of this research.
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1. Phenomenon is examined in a natural setting.
2. Data are collected by multiple means.
3. One or few entities (person, group, or organization) are examined.
4. The complexity of the unit is studied intensively.
5. Case studies are more suitable for the exploration, classification and hypothesis
development stages of the knowledge building process; the investigator should
have a receptive attitude towards exploration.
6. No experimental controls or manipulation are involved.
7. The investigator may not specify the set of independent and dependent variables
in advance.
8. The results derived depend heavily on the integrative powers of the investigator.
9. Changes in site selection and data collection methods could take place as the
investigator develops new hypotheses.
10. Case research is useful in the study of “why” and “how” questions because these
deal with operational links to be traced over time rather than with frequency or
incidence.
11. The focus is on contemporary events.

Table 5. Key Characteristics of Case Studies (Benbasat, 1987)

A case study is an ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is
needed (Feagin 1991). The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but
only when the relevant behaviors cannot be influenced (Yin 2003). Case studies are
designed to bring out the details from the viewpoint of the participants by using multiple
sources of data (Tellis 1997).
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3.5. Comparison Analysis
In final stage of completing this study, a comparative analysis of the usability of
guidelines created from the qualitative literature review will be performed. Patton (2002)
states, that understanding unique cases can be deepened by a comparative analysis.
Comparisons can also be important in illuminating differences between programs in
evaluation (Patton, 2002). In this study, the key management strategy used in each secure
network environment will be compared and analyzed to determine 1) which is better then
others, 2) if one is abstractly secure, and/or 3) if one has good characteristics in particular
environment will it satisfy the requirements of the others.

3.6. Content Analysis
3.6.1. Definition of Content Analysis
Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid
inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use. As a
technique, content analysis involves specialized procedures. It is learnable and
divorceable from the personal authority of the researcher. As a research technique,
content analysis provides new insights, increases a researcher’s knowledge of particular
phenomena, or informs practical actions (Krippendorff, 2004).

3.6.2. Advantages of Content Analysis
Compared with other data-generating and analysis techniques, content analysis has
several advantages (Weber, 1990):
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1. Communication is a central aspect of social interaction. Content analytic
procedures operate directly on text or transcripts of human communication.
2. The best content analysis studies use both qualitative and quantitative operations
on texts. Thus content analysis methods combine what are usually thought to be
antithetical modes or analysis.
3. Documents of various kinds exist over long periods of time. Culture indicators
generated form such series of documents constitute reliable data that may span
even centuries.
4. In more recent times, when reliable data of other kinds exist, culture indicators
can be used to assess quantitatively the relationships among economic, social,
political, and cultural change.
5. Compared with techniques such as interviews, content analysis usually provides
unobtrusive measures in which neither the sender nor the receiver of the message
is aware that it is being analyzed. Hence, there is little danger that the act of
measurement itself will act as a force for change that confounds the data.

3.6.3. Issues in Content Analysis
A central idea in content analysis is that the many words of the text are classified into
much fewer content categories. Each category may consist of one, several, or many
words. Words, phrases, or other units of text classified in the same category are presumed
to have similar meanings. Depending on the purposes of the investigator, this similarity
may be based on the precise meaning of the words, or may be based on words sharing
similar connotations. To make valid inferences from the text, it is important that the
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classification procedure be reliable in the sense of being consistent. Different people
should code the same text in the same way. Also, the classification procedure must
generate variables that are valid. A variable is valid to the extent that it measures or
represents what the investigator intends it to measure (Weber, 1990).

3.6.4. The Nine Step Process of Content Analysis
In the content analysis methodology, the researcher identifies the specific material
to be analyzed and how to precisely code that material (Leedy, 2001). Then the
researcher uses quantitative analysis techniques to a matrix of these coded entries to
construct the central themes across the data (Denzin, 2000). Neuendorf (2002) suggests
the nine step process. Table 6 briefly explains these steps.
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1. Theory and rationale: What content will be examined, and why? Are there certain
theories or perspectives that indicate that this particular message content is important to
study? Library work in needed here to conduct a good literature review.
↓
2. Conceptualizations: What variables will be used in the study, and how do you define
them conceptually? There are many way to define a given construct, and there is no one
right way.
↓
3. Operationalizations: Your measure should match your conceptualizations. What unit
of data collection will you use? An a priori coding scheme describing all measures must
be created. Both face validity and content validity may also be assessed
↓
4. Coding schemes: You need to create the following materials.
a. Codebook (with all variable measure fully explained)
b. Coding form
↓
5. Sampling: is a census of the content possible? How will you randomly sample a subset
of the content? This could be by time period, by issue, by page, by channel, and so forth.
↓
6. Training and pilot reliability: During a training session in which coders work
together, find out whether they can agree on the coding of variables.
↓
7. Coding: Use at least two coder, to establish intercoder reliability. Coding should be
done independently, with at least 10% overlap for the reliability test.
↓
8. Final reliability: Calculate a reliability figure for each variable.
↓
9. Tabulation and reporting: See various examples of content analysis result to see the
ways in which results can be reported. Figures and statistics may be reported one variable
at a time, or variables may be cross-tabulated in different ways.
Table 6. A Flowchart for Content Analysis Research (Neuendorf, 2002)
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3.7. Research Design
3.7.1. Theory and rationale
This step explains what references will be examined and why they are selected.
The focus of the content analysis is to include all of the articles related to key
management in secure wireless network. The reference materials will be collected using
various sources. Generally, the intentions of the researcher can cause certain references to
be included or excluded, which can be the source of significant bias. In order to reduce
this bias in the reference selection process, the references are chosen randomly (Leedy,
2001).

3.7.2. Conceptualizations
This step describes what variables will be used in the research and how they will
be conceptualized (Neuendorf, 2002). In order to answer the research questions, each of
the secure wireless network environments including the Wireless Network (WNs),
Wireless Sensor Network (WSNs), and Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are
explained. The basic concepts of cryptography used in each of the wireless networks are
described to provide insight into how the network is secured. The review chapter
provides an explanation of the Public Key Infrastructure which is the most effective
mechanism process for implementing Key Management.

3.7.3. Operationalizations
In this step, the unit of measure employed in this research is defined. This unit of
measure is important to provide the code schemes (Neuendorf, 2002). This research used
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the reference article as the unit of measure. In order to reduce researcher input into
selecting process, there is no weight and no bias based on the author or source. However,
since the primary researcher could not examine all of the related references, only a subset
of all possible references was used in this research.

3.7.4. Coding schemes
The coding scheme is used to analyze and categorize the data. Once all relevant
references are identified, the references will be coded to indicate if they provide
information on the characteristics of wireless networking and/or key management in a
secured wireless network. The words used in searching are “key management”,
“security”, and “cryptography”. In order to decide whether this is related to our key issue,
the three codes are employed, as follows:

0

Not mentioned – the issue is not mentioned at all in the material

1

Mentioned - the issue is merely mentioned in the material

2

Key Idea – the idea is fully developed and is the focus of the paper

From this analysis, the list of important related issues were generated and stored.
These issues were used by the research coders in order to analyze the material. The
researcher analyzed and assessed the existence of these issues contained in the key issue
list in the selected literatures.
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3.7.5. Sampling
Since it is impossible to execute a complete census of the reference population, a
random selection process was provided to collect data used in the content of the research
(Neuendorf, 2002). In order to identify Key Management issues in secured wireless
networks, a subsample of all related available literatures will be collected. The primary
source of material for this study will be obtained from the Association for Computing
Machinery (ACM; http://www.acm.org/) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE; http://www.ieee.org/portal/site). In addition, the online research
database in the AFIT Academy Library (http://www.afit.edu/library/) will be used to
identify other significant resources to be used in this research.
For each reference, the title and abstract of the material are examined. If this
material includes the concepts related to the research, the reference is read in its entirety.
If the material is relevant, the reference is classified into wireless network (WNs, WSNs,
and MANETs), key management (WNs, WSNs, and MANETs).

3.7.6. Training and pilot reliability
This section explains the role of research coders in performing their analysis. In
this research, the research coders did not exist. Ideally, several coders are required in
order to provide the reliability. Due to the limitations of obtain volunteers who have
enough background related to wireless networks, security, and cryptography to evaluate
and assess the data, this content analysis was conducted by only the primary researcher.
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3.7.7. Coding
From the references related to general key management, the problem and critical
issues of Key Management are examined and stored. These issues are recorded using the
tool such as Microsoft Office Excel 2003. These issues were numbered, (e.g. Factor-1,
Factor-2, … / Problem-1, Problem-2, …) While the selected are examined, if the ideas
related to issues is found, the number of the issues are counted in the spreadsheet of
Microsoft Office Excel 2003. The counted numbers of each issue are analyzed and
interpreted in order to identify the main problems and factors of Key Management in
each secure wireless network.

3.7.8. Final reliability
To make valid inferences from the text, it is important that the classification
procedure be reliable in the sense of being consistent: different people should code the
same text in the same way (Weber, 1990). Comparing the result of the primary researcher
with ones of several coders provide the measure of reliability in validating the results.
Since there are no coders to validate the results in this research, it is not possible to obtain
the measure of reliability. However, this research attempted to obtain the key issues from
a variety of references in order to examine various authors’ opinions related to Key
Management.

3.7.9. Tabulation and reporting
In the final step, the results of the study are tabulated and reported (Neuendorf,
2002). The final resulted were stored and arranged in the spreadsheet of Microsoft Office
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Excel 2003. These results were transferred into pie chart in order for displaying them
visually. These findings will be interpreted and discussed in chapter IV and chapter V.

3.8. Research Limitations
The results of this study are subject to limitations based upon constraints
encountered in the research process. First, as with all qualitative research, the researcher
plays a major role as key instruments in this study (Leedy, 2001). As a result, the intent
of researcher can drastically have an effect on the research results in a lot of ways. This
bias of researcher includes some issues such as researcher background, previous
knowledge, personal predispositions, researcher skill, and competency (Leedy, 2001).
Because of importance of researcher’s role, it is impossible to completely remove all bias.
In order to reduce this effect, all researchers should have an indirect position when
conducting their analysis. Consequently, reducing researcher bias and choice is
significant factor to provide good results. Unfortunately, in this study the author both
formulated the research questions and conducted the content analysis without additional
help in coding references.
Second, there is no way to perfectly obtain all written material concerning the key
management in a secured network environment. There is limited and restricted factor to
explore the related field in conducting this research. This issue must be considered when
the researcher makes conclusions from these results (Leedy, 2001). Further, there is very
little literature available about MANETs in general that contains substantial information
about key management.
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Third, some of the references that discuss securing wireless networks are
classified and unavailable to an international student. This may result in some newer
developments not being included in this research.
Finally, an inability to generalize the findings and results is another limitation of
this research. This research targets only wireless network environment and does not
attempt to generalize to other network environment. Thus, the guideline provided by this
research may not be suitable for combined network environment and new wireless
network environment which is not defined by this research.
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IV. An Analysis of Key Management
4.1. The Secure Network Environment
4.1.1. Overview
In this study, we focus our attention on secure wireless networks. Specifically, our
scope is limited to wireless networks (WNs), wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and
mobile ad hoc network (MANETs). In order to present the characteristics of each secure
network environment, a content analysis comprised of fifty-six salient documents was
conducted. A list of references is contained in Appendix A.

4.1.2. Wireless Networks (WNs)
Characteristics (Advantage)
Wireless networks are being deployed ubiquitously at a remarkable pace. Low
cost, ease of operation, platform independence, and product variety make them appealing
to everybody (Godber, 2002). Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) will facilitate
ubiquitous communications and location independent computing in restricted spatial
domains. The main attractions of wireless network include: cost effectiveness, ease of
installation, flexibility, tether-less access to the information infrastructure, and support
for ubiquitous computing through station mobility (Park, 1998).
Schmidt (2003) explains the characteristics of WLANs as requiring zero
configurations, ubiquity, and the ease of the creation of mesh networks. Karnik (2005)
identified and demonstrated the financial and performance benefits of WLANs:
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- Financial benefits: Intel Corporation conducted an analysis concluding that wireless
networks offer significant savings in two financial areas such as Total Cost of
Ownership (TCO) and Return on Investment (ROI).
- Performance benefits: Wireless networks also offer performance benefits in terms of
increased accuracy and productivity
The IEEE has specified various WLAN standards, some of which are
summarized below in Table 7 (Schmidt, 2003):

Standard

802.11a

802.11b

802.11g

Description

Application

•

5 GHz

•

Large-scale corporate environment

•

12 Channels

•

Less interference

•

22 Mbps

•

Higher performance

•

2.4 GHz

•

Hot Spots & Residential environment

•

3 Channels

•

Lower speed

•

11 Mbps

•

Low cost & Variety of products

•

2.4 GHz

•

Compatible with 802.11b

•

3 Channels

•

Higher speed

•

54 Mbps

Table 7. Wireless Local Area Network Standard (Schmidt, 2003)
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Weakness
Wireless networks provide convenience and low-cost deployment. However,
they lack any inherent means of strong security (Allen, 2002). The standards committee
for wireless network left many difficult security issues such as key management and a
robust authentication mechanism as open problems. The fact that wireless networks
provide a network access point for an adversary creates critical security problem. The
end-to-end problem (easy access) affects wired as well as wireless security. However, it
is much greater threat in wireless network because the attacker has easy access to the
transport medium (Arbaugh, 2003).
A wireless network can be as secure as a wired network if security guidelines are
implemented and enforced strictly. One of the major problems to provide secure network
environment in wireless network is that wireless media are inherently less secure
(Bharghavan, 1994). Security over a wireless environment is more complicated than in a
wired environment. Due to the wide open nature of wireless radio, many attacks could
make the network insecure (Chen, 2005).
Due to the nature of a wireless network, wireless communication is unprotected
and can easily be eavesdropped on or even spoofed (Eisinger, 2005). Since in wireless
LANs the bandwidth and the computing resources are limited, complex cryptographic
protocols such as those requiring extensive computations and transmissions can not be
considered (Park, 1998).
The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol was designed to provide
confidentiality for network traffic using the wireless protocol. However, when WLANs
was released, WEP was mistaken as an encryption solution. WEP was only designed to
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provide wired-equivalent privacy on a wireless network. A wireless solution that uses
WEP works in conjunction with another security system to provide the authentication and
accounting necessary. Even in those situations, WEP does not perform the encryption
necessary to consider a wireless network secure. Open source and freeware programs are
easily available that crack and decode WEP sessions. Universities provide ideal
incubators for such network subversion (Allen, 2002).

4.1.3. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
Characteristics (Advantage)
A sensor is a miniature device capable of detecting environmental conditions
such as temperature, sound, humidity, seismic tremors, or the presence of certain objects.
Sensors incorporate sensing, low-power data processing, and low-power wireless
communication capabilities (Olariu, 2005). Wireless Sensor networks is an emerging
paradigm of computing and networking where a node may be self-powered, and have
sensing, computing, and communication capabilities (Bai, 2004).
The main driving forces for wireless sensor networks are fault tolerance, energy
gain and spatial capacity gain. A wireless sensor network provides a suitable interface for
interaction, physical control, information harvesting and exchange (Bilstrup, 2003). In
sensor networks, it has many advantages to replace cables with wireless logical links. Its
key features are robustness, low complexity, low power and low cost. A restriction of a
position to set up sensor nodes disappears and it has more advantages to maintain, mend
and recover than the existing wired network (Choi, 2004).
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Being characterized by their low-power, small size, and cheap price, sensor
nodes are capable of wireless communication, sensing and computations (Dai, 2005).
Wireless sensor nodes have emerged as a result of recent advances in low-power digital
and analog circuitry, low-power RF design and sensor technology (Rajaravivarma, 2003).
Wireless sensor network have enabled the development of low-cost, low-power,
multifunctional sensor nodes that are small in size and communicated in short distances.
Sensor networks are highly vulnerable to security attacks (Tie, 2005).

Weakness
Remote wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to malicious attacks. While
wired and infrastructure-based wireless networks have mature intrusion detection systems
and sophisticated firewalls to block these attacks, wireless sensor networks have only
primitive defenses. Wireless networks require innovative medium access techniques to
share the limited broadcast bandwidth in a fair and efficient manner as computing and
communications devices continue to proliferate (Brownfield, 2005).
One of the major barriers to deploying security on sensor networks is that current
sensor devices have limited computation and communication capabilities. They are
vulnerable to attacks which are more difficult to launch in the wired domain. Sensor
networks are vulnerable to resource consumption attacks (Karlof, 2004). These sensors
are inexpensive, low-power devices. As a result, they have limited computational and
communication resources (Perrig, 2002).
When sensors are deployed in a hostile place like a battlefield, they are subject to
physical attacks by an adversary. The adversary may be able to undetectably take control
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of a sensor and compromise the cryptographic keys. The amount of key-storage in each
sensor is highly limited; it is not capable to store keys with every other sensor. Typical
sensor network platforms have very low bandwidth. Transmission reliability is often low,
making the transmission of large blocks of data particularly expensive (Chen, 2005).

4.1.4. Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)
Characteristics (Advantage)
An ad hoc WLAN has no ability to communicate with external networks without
using additional routing protocols (Housley, 2003). Mobile ad hoc networks are
infrastructure-free, pervasive, and ubiquitous without any centralized authority
(Alampalayam, 2005). Ad hoc networks characteristics (dynamic topology,
infrastructureless. variable capacity links. etc.) are origin of many issues (Bouam, 2003).
The most important characterizing feature of a MANET is the absence of any node in a
central role (Manikopoulos, 2003).
Interest in ad hoc networks largely stems from the ability to rapidly deploy them
under both normal and harsh conditions. These networks can be quickly deployed in
situations where no infrastructure exists and it would be impractical or infeasible to
deploy infrastructure. In such an infrastructure-less network, nodes are expected to
cooperate to perform essential networking tasks such as routing (Aboudagga, 2005).
Ad hoc networks require no centralized administration or fixed network
infrastructure such as base stations or access points, and can be quickly and inexpensively
set up as needed (Hu, 2002). The mobile ad hoc networks have several salient
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characteristics: Dynamic topologies, Bandwidth-constrained, Variable capacity links,
Energy constrained operation, Limited physical security (Yi, 2004).

Weakness
The lack of a clear line of defense and traffic concentration points poses a
challenge to deploying security solutions in ad hoc networks. The broadcast nature of the
transmission medium and the dynamically changing topology add even more
complications. Furthermore, the reliance on node collaboration as a key factor of network
connectivity presents another obstacle (Aboudagga, 2005). Ad hoc network routing
protocols are challenging to design, and secure ones are even more so. The protocols also
have high communication overhead because they send periodic routing messages even
when the network is not changing (Hu, 2002).
MANETs bring great challenges in security due to its high dynamics, link
vulnerability, and complete decentralization (Jiang, 2004). Major challenge is that of the
compromised node(s); this could be an overtaken attacked node or a physically captured
node (Manikopoulos, 2003). Ad hoc networks can be highly dynamic since wireless
nodes are free to move about. Furthermore, wireless nodes have limited battery life and
computational power to face these challenges (Suen, 2005). The problem is challenging
due to the lack of centralized management/monitoring component, error-prone multi-hop
wireless communication, and dynamics in the network topology (Yang, 2002). The ad
hoc networks are susceptible to attacks due to wireless links, energy constraints, and
difficulty to self-configure because of the mobility (Xie, 2004). Table 8 explains various
types of attacks possible on a MANET (Aboudagga, 2005).
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Method
GDH
(Capkun, 2003)
MOCA
(Yi, 2002)
CORE
(Michiardi, 2002)
Nuglets
(Buttyan, 2003)
CONFIDANT
(Buchegger, 2002)
Guardian Angel
(Avoine, 2002)
TIARA
(Ramanujan, 2000)
SEAD
(Hu, 2002)
Beacon
(Binkley, 2001)
SOS
(Yang, 2002)
SRP
(Papdimitratos, 2002)
ARIADNE
(Hu, 2002)
SAR
(Yi, 2002)
OSRP
(Awerbuch , 2002)
WatchDog/ Pathrater
(Marti, 2000)

Authentication

Type of attack
Routing Selfish

DoS

Open Issues

Yes

No

No

No

Mechanism for certificate
issues

Yes

Yes

No

No

Does not use the support of PKI

No

No

Yes

No

Considers only selfish node
attack

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Scheme is not generalized

No

Yes

Yes

No

Assumes nodes are
authenticated

Yes

No

Yes

No

Does not support varied attacks

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Not a generalized scheme

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Packet forwarding

Yes

Yes

No

No

Scalability and Key
Management

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Scalability issues

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Unfair utilization of resources

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Not optimized

Yes

Yes

No

No

Packet mistreatment attacks

Yes

Yes

No

No

Fixed but not adaptive threshold

No

Yes

No

No

Assumes no a priori
relationship

Table 8. Summary of Different Types of Attacks on a MANET (Aboudagga, 2005)
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4.1.5. Summary
Table 9 shows the advantage and weakness of each network environment.
Wireless networks (WNs) have infrastructure which support stronger security than other
wireless networks. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have sensor nodes with limited
resources, which provide low cost and easy installation, and restricted computation
capabilities. In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), there is no infrastructure. Although
this enables MANETs to be pervasive and ubiquitous, it creates a number of security
problems. These characteristics provide useful background information in order to
construct and design secure wireless networks.

Advantage

WN

WSN

Weakness

Ubiquitous deployment, low-cost,

- The bandwidth and the computing

easy operation, dependent platform

resources are limited.

(computing), flexibility , financial

- These natures of wireless network

and performance benefits

make the system to be less secure.

Robustness, self-powered, low-

Vulnerability to malicious attacks,

power, low-cost, easy maintenance

requirement of innovative medium
, limited computational and
communication resources

MANET

- No need of additional routing

- The lack of a clear line of defense

protocol and dynamic topology

and traffic concentration points

- Infrastructure-free, pervasive, and

- High communication overhead

ubiquitous without any centralized

- Great challenges in security due

authority

to its high dynamics, link
vulnerability, and complete
decentralization

Table 9. Advantage and Weakness of Secure Networks
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4.2. Key Management Problems
4.2.1. Overview
In order to identify key management in existing secure network deployments,
twenty-eight references (see Appendix B) related to key management were identified and
examined. In this section, we will detail the problems identified in Key Management.
Additionally, I identified fifty-six references which discuss key management in of each
secure network type in detail. A content analysis of the references is conducted and
discussed to identify the critical factors which affect the success of Key Management in
secure wireless network implementations from related 56 documents (See Appendix C).

4.2.2. Key Management Problems
One central problem of key management is key distribution, i.e., the problem of
establishing keying material whose origin, integrity, and-in the case of secret keysconfidentiality can be guaranteed. The problem with the concept of trust is that there is no
formal understanding of it. The amount of trust required of course depends to some
extent on the type of key management server (Fumy, 1993). Key management, in general,
can be a difficult problem because of issues as: Distribution of keys; Distribution of lists
containing revoked keys; Tracking which keys were valid during what period of time
(Witzke, 1994).
A weak tie between a key and its owner invites Man In The Middle (MITM)
attacks, which may succeed if the system can’t distinguish communications with an
intended recipient from those with the intervening attacker (Gutmann, 2004).
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When the number of services one has to access increases, key management
becomes a serious problem due to the fact that each membership-based service has a
different secret token and the memory space on each card is very limited (Harn, 1993).
Public key cryptography generally consumes lots of resources such as computation and
communication, which is not believed suitable for pervasive computing due to the limited
capabilities of pervasive devices (He, 2005). Furthermore, some of the key management
protocols being standardized are single purpose, intended for a specific OS1 layer
(Jansen, 1993).
All key-recovery systems require the existence of a highly sensitive and highly
available secret key or collection of keys that must be maintained in a secure manner over
an extended time period. These systems must make decryption information quickly
accessible to law-enforcement agencies without notice to the key owners. These basic
requirements make the problem of general key recovery difficult and expensive—and
potentially too un-secure and too costly for many applications and many users (Neumann,
1997). The key-management problem mainly concerns minimizing the cost of key update
communications and key storage requirements (Tseng, 2003).
Key management remains the primary obstacle to the wide-scale use of
cryptography (Reiter, 1996).With symmetric systems, the movement of keys from place
to place obviously must be done securely and with a level of protection adequate to
counter the threats of concern to the using parties. The private keys are usually selfgenerated, but they may also be generated from a central source, such as a corporate
security office. If all secure communications take place within the same corporation or
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among locations under a common line of authority, key management is an internal or
possibly a joint obligation (Dam, 1996).

4.2.3. Result and Analysis
The problems we identified in key management identified are summarized in
Table 10 below.

1. Key distribution and the concept of trust
2. Weak relationship between keys
3. Different secret scheme
4. Limited memory storage and resource
5. Insufficient standard of key management
6. Difficult and expensive key recovery
7. Increasing cost of key management
8. Difficulty to apply wide-used cryptography
Table 10. The Problems of Key Management

Throughout a majority of references, the authors state that main problem is the
distribution of the secret key. Most cryptography systems use the concept of key in order
to support security. In a symmetric key system, parties to communicate with each other
have pre-shared key. In addition, the public key is known to everyone in order to join the
network using asymmetric key cryptography. While a wired network is supported by
strong secure infrastructure, it is difficult for wireless networks to be as strongly secured.
Thus, it is required to provide effective key distribution in deploying security wireless
network.
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Table 11 and Figure 5 illustrate how many references focus on each of the
identified problems. Fifty-six references related to the key management problem were
identified. Subsequently, they were divided into three categories: WNs, WSNs, and
MANETs. Seven references were related to WNs, twenty-one references were related to
WSNs, and twenty-eight references were related to MANETs. In all wired network
references, the key distribution problem was identified. In all wireless network
references key distribution, limited resources, insufficient and weak relationship
standardization were identified. In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), key distribution,
different secret scheme, limited resources, and key recovery were identified. MANETs
references primarily deal with key distribution and increasing cost or key management.
In Table11, WNs have a greater occurance of problems 1, 4, and 5 than any other
network. This means that key distribution, limited resources, and insufficient standard are
main problems in WNs. WSNs have a greater occurance of problems 1, 3, and 6 than any
other network. This means that key distribution, different secret scheme, and difficult key
recovery are main problems in WSNs. MANETs have a greater occurance of problem 1
and 7 than any other network. This means that key distribution and increasing cost are
main problems in MANETs. In all of three wireless networks, the key distribution is a
main problem in deploying secure network. Figure 5 graphically displayed the results
using pie chart.
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WN (7)

WSN (21)

MANET (28)

Problem 1

7

17

23

Problem 2

5

5

12

Problem 3

2

15

10

Problem 4

6

11

4

Problem 5

6

5

6

Problem 6

1

14

11

Problem 7

1

4

20

Problem 8

3

6

9

Table 11. References Identifying Key Management Problems

Figure 5. Percentage of Key Management References by Problem

4.3. Factors Affecting Key Management
4.3.1. Overview
In order to provide the critical factors of key management, twenty-eight references
related to key management were used (See Appendix B). The critical factors of key
management problems were identified and will be explained in the next section.
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Additionally, we present the major factors in each secure wireless network from related
fifty-six (See Appendix C).

4.3.2. Critical Factors of Key Management
Key management schemes are usually evaluated by the number of total keys the
system must maintain, the number of keys each user receives, the size of public
information, the time required to derive keys for access classes, and work needed to
perform when the hierarchy or the set of users change (Atallah, 2005). The efficiency of a
centralized key management scheme is primarily measured by re-key overhead at the key
server that is defined as the average number of re-key messages transmitted by the key
server to users per key updating, the re-key overhead at users that is defined as the
average number of re-key messages received by the users per key updating, and storage
overhead that is defined as the average number of keys stored at the key server and the
users (Zhang, 2004).
A security domain is a collection of systems (servers, devices, and so on) that
share a common set of keys and are attached to an administered network. Security
domains provide a useful approach for dealing with logical keying structures for data
protection in large-scale systems in which many objects must be protected (Michener,
2000).
Harris (2003) explains the three principles and six rules of key management. The
principles are following: Key should not be in clear-text outside the cryptography device.
All of key distribution and maintenance should be automated and hidden form the user.
Backup copies should be available and easily accessible when required. In addition, the
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rules are following: The key length should be long enough to provide the necessary level
of protection. Keys should be stored and transmitted by secure means. The key’s lifetime
should correspond with the sensitivity of the data it is protecting. The more the key is
used, the shorter its lifetime should be. Keys should be backed up or escrowed incase of
emergencies. Keys should be properly destroyed when their lifetime comes to an end.
The most important design criteria for a key management system are listed below
(Fumy, 1993).

1. Minimize the number and complexity of trusted mechanisms involved. Especially,
minimize the involvement of central mechanisms.
2. Minimize physical activity, e.g., the use of couriers should be kept at a minimum
(i.e., nonexistent if possible). This requirement also implies that for registration,
entities should not have to travel far (for large systems, this suggests a hierarchical
approach).
3. Minimize the need for physical security, e.g., the number and size of tamperresistant devices, or the number of secure channels required.
4. Achieve maximum flexibility with regard to specific key distribution protocols and
specific cryptographic algorithms.
5. Achieve maximum robustness (e.g., self-synchronization when keys are updated).
6. Ensure that if any one entity is dishonest, that entity may be exposed.
Table 12. Design Criteria for Key Management
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4.3.3. Result and Analysis
The critical factors of key management that I identified are summarized in Table
13 below.

1. Key management is evaluated by the number of key, the information size, required
time, needed work.
2. Security domains provide a useful approach for dealing with key management.
3. Key should not be in clear-text outside the cryptography device.
4. All of key distribution and maintenance should be automated and hidden form the
user.
5. Backup copies should be available and easily accessible when required.
6. Minimize the number and complexity of trusted mechanisms and physical activity,
and the need for physical security
7. Achieve maximum flexibility and robustness
8. Ensure that if one is dishonest, it may be exposed
Table 13. The Critical Factors of Key Management

There are many references that explain which key management philosophy is
better in a particular network environment and how to manage key secrecy effectively.
However, there are no abstract factors which seem to influence all wireless networks.
Due to their unique characteristics, each network type is suitable for different
environment. Wireless network (WNs) are used in the situation where there is
infrastructure to support security. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are suitable for the
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environment which does not require a lot of resources and computation capabilities. The
network environments such as dynamic topology and no infrastructure make it possible to
emerge the mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Table 14 and Figure 6 together
summarize the fact that there are no dominating factors. Therefore, it is important to
identify the characteristics of the network environment before considering a particular
key management methodology.
Table 14 and Figure 6 show that there are no main dominating factors. Most
factors influenced each of the secure wireless network. Moreover, these illustrate that
some factors which affect the particular wireless network are not main factors in other
wireless networks. Therefore, it is possible to solely suggest particular factors affecting
general wireless network.

WN (7)

WSN (21)

MANET (28)

Factor 1

7

20

24

Factor 2

6

17

14

Factor 3

1

18

14

Factor 4

4

3

22

Factor 5

3

12

17

Factor 6

4

7

6

Factor 7

5

15

6

Factor 8

3

17

3

Table 14. The Number of Key Management References Identifying Critical Factors
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Figure 6. The Percentage of Key Management References Identifying Critical Factors

4.4. Key Management Solutions in Secured Networks
4.4.1. Overview
In this section, we will examine and discuss key management solutions in detail.
Each key management solution will be explained and its strengths and weaknesses will
be discussed. Finally, we will make suggestions which solution is suitable in each secure
network environment.

4.4.2 Key Management Solutions
4.4.2.1. Partially Distributed Certificate Authority (PDCA)
Using a (k, n) threshold, Zhou (1999) proposed this solution in order to distribute
the services of the certificate authority to specialized server nodes. Each of these nodes
has a capability to generate a partial certificate using their share of the certificate signing
key. However, a valid certificate can be obtained only by combining k such partial
certificates.
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The system contains three types of nodes; client, server and combiner nodes. The
client nodes are the normal users of the network while the server and combiner nodes are
part of the certificate authority. The server nodes are responsible for generating partial
certificates and storing certificates in a directory structure allowing client nodes to
request for the certificates of other nodes. The combiner nodes which are also server
nodes are responsible for combining the partial certificates into a valid certificate.
Although not stated implicitly by the authors the system also has an administrative
authority which will be termed the dealer. The dealer is the only entity in the system that
has knowledge of the complete certificate signing key skCA .
Every node in the network has a public/private key pair and it is the
responsibility of the dealer to issue the initial certificate for the nodes public key as well
as distributing the public key pkCA of the certificate authority which is needed to verify
the certificates.
The certificate authority as a whole has a public/private key pair, pkCA / skCA of
which the public key is known to all network nodes. The private key skCA , is shared
among the server nodes according to Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (Fokine, 2002).
Figure 7 illustrates the different components of the system.

68

Figure 7. Partially Distributed Certificate Authority (Fokine, 2002)

4.4.2.2. Fully Distributed Certificate Authority (FDCA)
This solution is introduced by (Luo, 2000; Kong, 2001; Luo, 2002). In order to
distribute an RSA certificate signing key to all nodes in the network, a (k, n) threshold
scheme is used. It also uses verifiable and proactive secret sharing mechanisms to protect
against denial of service attacks and compromise of the certificate signing key. The
service of a certificate authority is distributed to a set of specialized server nodes. By
using secret sharing, each of these nodes can generate partial certificates and by
combining enough of them a valid certificate can be created.
In this solution, the capabilities of the CA are distributed to all nodes in the ad
hoc network, see Figure 8. Any operations requiring the CA’s private key skCA can only
be performed by a coalition of k or more nodes. The services provided by the CA can be
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grouped as certificate related services and system maintenance services. The certificate
related services include certificate renewal and revocation.
The system maintenance services include incorporating joining nodes into the
CA, i.e. provide them with their share of the CA’s private key skCA . This service is called
share initialization. The system maintenance also includes proactively updating the shares
of the CA’s private key to protect it from being compromised. This service is termed
share update.
The availability of the service is based on the assumption that every node will
have a minimum of k one-hop neighbors and that the nodes are provided with a valid
certificate prior to their joining the network. The system then provides services to
maintain and update these initial certificates (Fokine, 2002).

Figure 8. Fully Distributed Certificate Authority (Fokine, 2002)
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4.4.2.3. Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP)
There are different possibilities of authentication, which use either a Trusted
Third Part (TTP) or a Chain of Trust. Recently, a lot of research has been interested in the
field of Zero Knowledge Proofs. In theory, Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) is introduced
by (Goldwasser, 1991). This method provides a good solution to node identification. Zero
Knowledge Proofs allow one party to prove its knowledge of a secret to another party
without revealing any information of the secret itself.
Suppose that Alice knows a fact. She wants to convince Bob that she knows P, but
she does not trust Bob. Thus, Alice does not want to reveal nay more knowledge to Bob
than is necessary. What Alice needs is a zero-knowledge proof of P.
For example, suppose that Alice wants to prove to Bob that she really is Alice.
Suppose for convenience that there is some authority that verifies identities. One
possibility is that the authority could issue Alice identification. If this were contained on
a device such as a smart card, Alice could simply show it to Bob. However, if Alice and
Bob are communicating over a network, then Alice’s identifying information would have
to be transmitted to Bob over the network. On receiving it, Bob could use it to
impersonate Alice. Even if Bob were trusted, an eavesdropper such as Alice’s adversary
Carol could do the same.
This situation also arises commonly in computer access control: Bob might then be a
host computer or network server, and Alice’s identification might be a password. If Alice
uses her password to identify herself, her password is exposed to the host software as
well as eavesdroppers; anyone who knows this password can impersonate Alice. It is thus
desirable for Alice to be able to prove her identity without revealing any private
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information. More generally, we need a scheme through which Alice can prove to Bob
that she possesses something such as passwords without having to reveal it. Such a
scheme is an example of a zero-knowledge proof. In fact, this example is the major
practical use of zero-knowledge that has been suggested to date.
Here is one way that such a system could be organized. The authority decides on a
number N used for everyone; for example, take N = 77 . Everyone knows this number.
The authority may then choose, for example, two numbers that form an ID for Alice.
Suppose these are {58, 67}. Everyone knows Alice’s ID. The authority then computes
two other numbers {9, 10} that are given to Alice alone; she keeps these private. The
latter numbers were chosen because 92 × 58 ≡ 1 (mod 77) and 102 × 67 ≡ 1 (mod 77) .
Now, Alice can identify herself to Bob by proving that she possesses the secret number
{9, 10} without revealing them. Each time she wishes to do this, she can proceed as
follows.
She can choose some random numbers such as {19, 24, 51} and compute

192 ≡ 53 (mod 77)
242 ≡ 37 (mod 77)
512 ≡ 60 (mod 77)
Alice then sends {53, 37, 60} to Bob. Bob chooses a random 3 by 2 matrix of 0’s
and 1’s, for example,

0 1
E =1 0
1 1
Bob sends E to Alice. On receipt, Alice computes.
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19 × 90 ×101 ≡ 36 (mod 77)
24 × 91 ×100 ≡ 62 (mod 77)
51× 91 ×101 ≡ 47 (mod 77)
Alice sends {36, 62, 47} to Bob. Finally, Bob can check to see that Alice is who she
says she is. He does this by checking that

362 × 580 × 671 ≡ 53 (mod 77)
622 × 581 × 670 ≡ 37 (mod 77)
47 2 × 581 × 671 ≡ 60 (mod 77)
The original numbers {53, 37, 60} that Alice sent reappear. Actually, this doesn’t
really prove Alice’s identity; she could have been an impersonator. But the chances of an
impersonator succeeding would have been only 1 in 64.
In an actual system, the number N would have been much larger (for example, 160
digits). Also, Alice would have been assigned an ID consisting of more number, for
example, 4, by the authority, with a secret also consisting of four numbers. Furthermore,
Alice would have generated more random numbers, for example, 5, to send to Bob. The
ID numbers, secret numbers, and random numbers would have been about as large as N.
This would have reduced an impersonator’s chances of cheating successfully to about 1
in a million (more precisely 2−20 ) if 4 and 5 are the parameters, which certainly would
have convinced Bob of Alice’s identity (Mollin, 2003).
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4.4.2.4. Self Issued Certificates (SIC)
This solution is proposed by Hubaux (2001). This provides a public key
management solution similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) (Garfinkel, 1995) in the sense
that certificates are issued by the users themselves without the aid of any certification
authority.
This solution, like PGP, deals with the problem of distributing public keys in an
authenticated manner. Unlike traditional PKI solutions, in PGP the public keys aren’t
certified by some trusted third party, e.g. a CA. Instead each user has the capability of
certifying the public keys of other users. It is then up to each user to determine how much
trust to place in a specific certificate. Figure 9 illustrates a simple example of how PGP
works. Bob has issued a certificate to Chris thus stating that pkChris really is the public
key belonging to Chris. Alice has also issued a certificate to Bob, indicating that pk Bob is
really the public key belonging to Bob. Alice also trusts Bob not to issue any false
certificates, thus Alice will trust any certificates issued by him. Therefore having
cert Alice , Bob and cert Bob ,Chris , Alice can verify that pkChris is authentic. She can then

securely communicate with Chris even though they have never met (Fokine, 2002).
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Figure 9. Example of a certificate chain (Fokine, 2002)

In PGP, public key servers, i.e. certificate directories are used to distribute
certificates; however in ad hoc networks no such servers are available and therefore the
solution proposed by Hubaux (2001) relies on the users to distribute and store the
certificates themselves. Each user stores a small number of certificates that have been
issued. When two users wish to authenticate each others’ public keys, they try to find a
certificate chain using only the certificates stored in their combined local certificate
repositories (Fokine, 2002).

Figure 10. Building certificate chains (Fokine, 2002)
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4.4.2.5. Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE)
Asokan (2000) introduced a password authenticated group key agreement
protocol. He considered a collaborative network scenario where a group of people wishes
to establish a secure wireless network during a meeting. In order to obtain such a
security, a written password is selected. The protocol used in this solution is based on the
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol.
The meeting members have no means of authenticating the other members using
e.g. digital certificates. Therefore a simple password is chosen and e.g. written on a
whiteboard. Using this weak password the members can engage in the password
authenticated Hypercube protocol which results in them sharing a strong secret. The key
agreement protocol needs to be authenticated to protect against active attacks, e.g. manin-the-middle attacks.
A number of group key establishment protocols are compared along with the
Hypercube protocol. The nodes participating in the protocol are arranged as the vertices
in a d-dimensional cube, a hypercube. The protocol then consists of d rounds of two-party
Diffie-Hellman key exchange. During each round j = 1,…, d a node performs the twoparty key exchange with its neighbor in the j : th dimension. In the first round each node i
uses his own secret xi as the exponent. In the following rounds the key obtained from the
previous round is used as the secret exponent.
Figure 11 illustrates the Hypercube protocol where the number of participants is
four, i.e. d = 2 . In the first round nodes 1 and 2 perform a two-party Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, in parallel nodes 3 and 4 do the same. After the first round the pairs (1, 2) and
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(3, 4) share a common secret k1, 2 and k3, 4 . In the second and final round nodes 1 and 3
perform a two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange, as do nodes 2 and 4. The key
exchange in the previous round is now used as the secret exponent in the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. E.g. node 1 sends g

k1, 2

mod p to node 3 and node 3 sends g

k3 , 4

mod p to

node 1. After the second round is complete all four nodes share a secret k (Fokine, 2002).

Figure 11. The Hypercube protocol used to provide four nodes (Fokine, 2002)

4.4.3. Analysis
Both Partially Distributed Certificate Authority (PDCA) and Fully Distributed
Certificate Authority (FDCA) use the concept of (k, n) threshold in order to distribute the
service of certificate authority. In PDCA, there are special server nodes which provide
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generate partial certificates and allow client nodes to request for the certificates of other
nodes. For this reason, it is required to select the special nodes. On the other hand,
FDCA allows each node to certificate themselves without any special nodes. Strong
certificates may be not expected depending on the function of each node. Zero
Knowledge Proof (ZKP) allows identifying without revealing any information related
secret. Although this requires less computation power, this may result in increasing
overheads as increasing users. Self Issue Certificates (SIC) manage the key distribution
in a similar fashion to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). It does not require infrastructure, but
the initial phase is required. Finally, Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE)
makes meeting members to share strong secret using weak password. However, it is
group-oriented. The advantages and weaknesses are summarized in Table 15,
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Advantage
The solution is suitable for planned,
long-term ad hoc networks. Since it is
based on public key encryption it
PDCA
requires that the all the nodes are
capable of performing the necessary
computations.
This solution is aimed towards
planned, long-term ad hoc networks
with nodes capable of public key
encryption. However, since the
FDCA
service is distributed among all the
nodes when they join the network,
there is no need to elect or choose any
specialized server nodes.
ZKPs typically require significantly
less computing power than traditional
identification paradigms, which
ZKP
makes them especially appealing for
ad hoc networks.

Weakness
This solution requires that a serverand organizational/administrative
infrastructure is available and
therefore is only applicable to a subset
of ad hoc network applications.
A larger number of shares are exposed
to compromise since each node has its
own share as compared to only the
specialized server nodes in the
partially distributed solution.

The problem with this proof is that it
affords interaction between prover
and verifier.
It is means an increase of overheads
in communication between the parties
involved in the authentication process.
The main benefit of this solution is
It requires an initial phase during
that it doesn’t require any form of
which its effectiveness is limited and
SIC
infrastructure neither routing, server
therefore it is unsuitable for shortor organizational/administrative.
term networks.
Using the weak password the
This is a group-oriented solution since
PAKE members, they are able to share a
it doesn’t allow for authentication of
strong secret.
individual nodes.
Table 15. Advantages and Weaknesses of Solutions

From the advantages and weaknesses of each solution, we suggest which
network is a suitable solutions. Table 16 illustrates the comparison in each wireless
network. This table shows which solution may be more suitable for a given wireless
network. PDCA and FDCA are suitable for WSNs and MANETs since the nodes in the
network function as a router. ZKP is suitable for WNs and MANETs since it requires less
computing power. SIC is suitable for WNs and MANETs. Since the initial phase is
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required, many problems may occur in WSNs. PAKE have limitations using WSNs and
MANETs where there is no infrastructure to support security services. Table 16 explains
which solution is suitable to apply to each network environment.

WN

WSN
√
√
√

MANET
√
√
√
√

PDCA
FDCA
ZKP
SIC
√
PAKE
√
Table 16. A Comparison of Solutions in Each Wireless Network Environment
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V. Discussion and Conclusions
5.1. Overview
In chapter 4, we examined the most important characteristics of implementing
security in wireless network environments. We also identified critical factors which
determine if a key management methodology is effective in a given network
environment. We identified and discussed common problems encountered when
deploying key management and discussed possible solutions. In this chapter, we will
apply the knowledge we gained in chapter 4 and discuss them in the context of answering
the research questions. Finally, we will present the findings of the research, the
significance of research findings, and provide recommendations for future research.

5.2. Discussion
In chapter 1, we presented the primary research question and five related
investigative questions in order to assess and identify existing key management
techniques in secure communication network and to identify the strengths and
weaknesses inherent in their design. The primary research question to be answered was
“What are characteristics in using Key Management in wireless network?” and five
investigated questions are below.
1) What are the characteristics of various secure wireless communications?
2) What are the problems of implementing secure wireless network?
3) What are the critical success factors in deployment of a secure wireless network?
4) What cryptographic techniques are possible in secure wireless network?
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5) What is the advantages/weakness of each cryptography technique?

The first question is what are the characteristics of various secure wireless
communications? In order to answer this question, we investigated the characteristics of
various network environments. Generally, Wireless Networks (WN) have infrastructure
to support security. The networks are easy and flexible to establish, but they are
vulnerable to suffer from potential attack. Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) have unique
characteristics such that low-power, self-power, and low cost. However, the sensor nodes
have limited sources. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) establish the temporary
network without infrastructure. Due to this characteristic, this network is more flexible
than wireless network, and has dynamic topology. However, this has critical problem of
security.
The second question is what are the problems of implementing secure wireless
network? The problems we identified in implementing secure network focused on the
issues related to key management. The major problems identified are key distribution and
the lack of resources such as storage and computational capability to enable encryption.
In conventional networks, key distribution is centralized, uses fixed infrastructure, and is
deployed by the organization to support the network. In contrast, the wireless network
environment creates difficulties due to it lack of infrastructure. In addition, the nodes of
wireless network typically have limited resources which severely limits the possible
cryptographic solutions. Thus, if it is desired to implement strong security in a wireless
network, the nodes in the network should be designed with sufficient storage and
computational power to support the desired cryptography solution.
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The third question is what are the critical success factors in deployment of a
secure wireless network? In order to overcome the stated problems, we looked for
critical issues when implementing key management. In order to secure a network, one
must consider how key management is implemented. A review of the relevant literature,
well defined policies, procedures, and processes to support key generation, key storage,
key distribution, key updating, key revocation, and certificate service must be defined. In
order to realize effective key management, it is important to identify the characteristics
and problem of network environment and to employ appropriate solution in the network.
The fourth question is what types of cryptography are used to secure wireless
network? This research identified several solutions used in securing network. The
partially distributed certificate authority and fully distributed certificated authority
employed the concept of (k, n) threshold. The zero knowledge proof is novel identity
technique which proves its knowledge of a secret to another without revealing any
information. Self issued certificate issues certificate without any aid of certification
authority is similar to Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Finally, password authenticated key
exchange is authenticated group key agreement protocol using password.
The fifth question is what is the advantages/weakness of each cryptography
technique? We examined the advantage and weakness of each solution. Partially
distributed certificate authority and fully distributed certificate authority are designed to
be suitable for ad hoc networks. Zero knowledge proof requires less computing power,
but the network overhead is increased as the participants are increased. Self issued
certificate does not require infrastructure. In order to effective communication, however,
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an initial phase is preceded. In password authenticate key exchange, the member of a
group are able to share a strong secret using the weak password.

5.3. Conclusion
The objective of research is to provide guidelines for successful implementation
in secure wireless communication network. This research effort was an attempt to look
for the critical factors in implementing key management in various wireless network
environments in order to support secure communication in military operation.
In this research, we have found that secure communication must be supported by
strong key management. In addition, when secure communications are constructed, the
network environment should be identified and appropriate security methods should be
provided. Even if a technically sound secure communications is constructed, the
underlying security can be easily compromised without strong key management. It is
recommended that WSN and MANET nodes be designed with increased computational
and storage capability to support stronger cryptographic mechanisms.

5.4. Significance
The research finding have identified best practices and guidelines used when
securing a wireless communications environment. A comparison between cryptographic
solutions in terms of their strength and key management complexity was provided to
enable the best selection for a given application. The research findings can aid in
deploying secure communications in the military operations, law enforcement, and
disaster response domains.
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5.5. Future Research
This research focused only on the wireless network environment. A broader study
which examines all network topologies would provide additional insight into problems
and solutions in key management.
Future research could explore the military communication environment in detail
and possible compare and contrast with the non-military communication environment.
This would prove beneficial because of the unique characteristics of military
communication could be identified and the possible solutions could be suggested. This
work could provide a similar analysis to this study with the intent of providing effective
guidelines to implement securing military communication network.

5.6. Summary
Key management issues are very important in secure communications network.
Since existing key management solutions are based on fixed networks, advanced wireless
network technologies such as wireless sensor network and mobile ad hoc network require
more interests and effort to apply to military network. In this chapter, we answered the
research questions we formulated and identified important guidelines when constructing a
secure wireless networks.
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